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The Resurgence of the Maternal Wall:
Revisiting Accommodation under the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act
Mikaela Shawt
INTRODUCTION
Increasingly first-time mothers are choosing to work both
during their pregnancies and until a later time into their
pregnancies.1  Additionally, women are the primary
breadwinners in more than 41 percent of families and in 70
percent of low-wage families, indicating that these women's
ability to continue working while pregnant has far-reaching
effects. 2 At the same time, claims of pregnancy discrimination to
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
increased at a fast pace; from 2005 to 2011 claims rose nearly 23
percent. 3 Thus, pregnant women are integral to the workforce,
t BA 2012, Indiana University-Bloomington; JD Candidate 2015, The University of
Chicago Law School. I would like to thank Professor Laura Weinrib for her valuable
insights and ideas throughout the Comment process.
1 "Between 1961 and 1965, for example, 44 percent of first-time mothers worked
during their pregnancies; in contrast, between 2006 and 2008, nearly two-thirds of first-
time mothers worked while pregnant. Women are also working later into their
pregnancies. Between 1961 and 1965, less than 35 percent of working first-time mothers
were still on the job one month or less before giving birth. But times have changed. Now
an overwhelming majority of first-time mothers are working late into their pregnancies.
Almost nine out of ten (88 percent) first-time mothers who worked while pregnant
worked into their last two months of pregnancy in 2006-2008, and more than eight out
of ten (82 percent) worked into their last month of pregnancy." See Emily Martin, et al,
It Shouldn't Be a Heavy Lift: Fair Treatment for Pregnant Workers *3 (National Women's
Law Center 2013), online at http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/pregnant
workers.pdf (visited Oct 18, 2014); United States Census Bureau, Maternity Leave and
Employment Patterns of First-time Mothers: 1961-2008 *4 (Oct 2011), online at
http: //www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p70-l28.pdf (visited Oct 18, 2014).
2 See Martin, It Shouldn't Be a Heavy Lift at *3 (cited in note 1).
See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Pregnancy Discrimination
Charges EEOC & FEPAs Combined: FY 1997 FY 2011 (2012), online at
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement /pregnancy.cfm (visited Oct 18, 2014).
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and pregnancy discrimination protections should be a top
concern.4
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19645 did not specifically
include pregnancy, so in 1978 Congress adopted the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act (PDA)6 to prohibit sex discrimination on the
basis of pregnancy.7 However, since its enactment, the language
of the PDA has proved difficult to interpret consistently. The Act
stipulates that employers must treat women affected by
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions equal to
other employees on the basis of their ability or inability to
work. 8 Further, Congress intended the PDA to prohibit both
state and private employers from treating pregnancy differently
than other disabilities covered by temporary disability policies.9
The PDA's first clause adds "pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions" to the definition of sex, while the
second clause establishes that pregnant employees shall be
treated the same as similar ability workers. 10 However, the law
does not explicitly address the nature of this same treatment.
For example, the law fails to specify if and how an employer
should make accommodations for a pregnant employee in
relation to accommodations the employer makes for other
employees. Confusion arises when courts attempt to reconcile
the language of these two clauses, but all PDA accommodation
claims require identifying a comparator individual or group who
is similarly situated but treated differently than the pregnant
employee with respect to ability to work." Courts have widely
4 See US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Women in the Labor Force: A Databook, BLS
Reports 1040, *1 (BLS Mar 26, 2013), online at http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-databook-
2012.pdf (visited Oct 18, 2014).
Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 241 (1964), codified at 42 USC § 2000e.
6 Pub L No 95-555, 92 Stat 2076 (1978), codified at 42 USC § 2000e(k).
See Pregnancy Disability Conference Report, HR Rep No 95-1786, 95th Cong, 2d
Sess 51 (1978).
8 See HR Rep No 95-1786 at 53 (cited in note 7).
9 'This bill would require that women disabled due to pregnancy ... be provided
the same benefits as those provided other disabled workers. This would include
temporary and long-term disability insurance, sick leave, and other forms of employee
benefit programs." See HR Rep No 95-948, 95th Cong, 2d Sess 51, 5 (1978); see also
S 995, 95th Cong, 2d Sess 5 (1978).
10 42 USC § 2000e(k).
" The fourth prong of the indirect evidence framework for a prima facie case of
pregnancy discrimination requires a showing that there is a nexus between her
pregnancy and the adverse employment decision. That fourth element can be
demonstrated through comparison to "another employee who is similarly situated in her
566 [ 2014
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held that suitable comparators are non-pregnant workers who
are temporarily disabled whom employers treat better than
pregnant workers with similar limitations. 12
The comparator standard has given rise to a prominent
circuit split that further complicates this area of law. The
Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits held that the only
appropriate comparators are those who became disabled off the
job. 13 These courts comprise the majority and have interpreted
employer policies that accommodate employees disabled off the
job, but not on the job, as "pregnancy-blind," and thus valid
under the PDA.14 Meanwhile the Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth
Circuits form the minority rule; these circuits held that the
similarly situated analysis should compare a pregnant employee
to any other employee who has a similar ability or inability to
perform the job, including those who became temporarily
disabled due to a workplace injury while on the job.15
or his ability or inability to work [and who] received more favorable benefits." See
Ensley-Gaines v Runyon, 100 F3d 1220, 1226 (6th Cir 1996). See also Deborah A. Widiss,
Gilbert Redux: The Interaction of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the Amended
Americans with Disabilities Act, 46 UC Davis L Rev 961, 1016 (2013).
12 See Ensley-Gaines, 100 F3d at 1226 (holding that an individual employee "need
only demonstrate that another employee who was similar in her or his ability or inability
to work received the employment benefits denied to her"); Serednyj v Beverly Healthcare,
LLC, 656 F3d 540, 548 (7th Cir 2011) (explaining that an "employer is not required to
provide an accommodation to a pregnant employee unless it provides the same
accommodation to its similarly situated nonpregnant employees"); Urbano v Continental
Airlines, Inc, 138 F3d 204, 208 (5th Cir 1998) (explaining that an employer is entitled to
deny a pregnant employee a light-duty assignment as long as it treats other workers
injured off duty the same).
Is See Young v United Parcel Service, Inc, 707 F3d 437, 449 (4th Cir 2013) (holding
that where a policy treats pregnant workers and nonpregnant workers alike, the
employer has complied with the PDA); Urbano, 138 F3d at 208 (holding that as long as
pregnant employees are treated the same as other employees injured off duty, a light-
duty policy that only accommodates on-duty injuries is compliant with the PDA); Spivey
v Beverly Enterprises, Inc, 196 F3d 1309, 1312-13 (11th Cir 1999) (finding that
"pregnant employees must be treated the same as every other employee with a non-
occupational injury"); Troupe v May Department Stores Co, 20 F3d 734, 738-39 (7th Cir
1994) (holding that "employers can treat pregnant women as badly as they treat
similarly affected but nonpregnant employees" and noting the court's "doubt that finding
a comparison group would be that difficult").
14 Young, 707 F3d at 446 (holding that "UPS has crafted a pregnancy-blind
policy.. .. Such a policy is at least facially a 'neutral and legitimate business practice');
Serednyj, 656 F3d at 548-49 (finding that since the employer's modified work policy is
pregnancy-blind it is valid); Spivey, 196 F3d at 1313 (holding that an "employer must
ignore an employee's pregnancy and treat her 'as well as it would have if she were not
pregnant'), quoting Piraino v International Orientation Resources, Inc, 84 F3d 270, 274
(7th Cir 1996); Urbano, 138 F3d at 206 (holding an employer policy valid because the
light-duty policy treated pregnant employees the same as non-pregnant employees).
1" See Ensley-Gaines, 100 F3d at 1226 (holding that the plaintiff "need only
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In the thirty-six years since the passage of the PDA, many
women have sought the protections of the PDA. However, the
circuit split creates inconsistent PDA application and job
security for pregnant employees. 16 Additionally, over the last
decade the number of PDA cases has also increased.17 Thus as
pregnancy increasingly becomes a more common workplace
experience, the application of the PDA assumes greater
importance. EEOC Chair Jacqueline A. Berrian explained, "[W]e
continue to see a significant number of charges alleging
pregnancy discrimination, and our investigations have revealed
the persistence of overt pregnancy discrimination, as well as the
emergence of more subtle discriminatory practices." 18 In the
response, the EEOC placed a renewed focus on pregnancy
discrimination. The EEOC's December 2012 Strategic
Enforcement Plan (SEP) identified accommodating pregnancy
related limitations under the PDA as an enforcement effort
focus.19 And in July 2014, the EEOC issued the Enforcement
Guidance on Pregnancy Discrimination and Related Guidance. 20
demonstrate that another employee who was similar in her or his ability or inability to
work received the employment benefits denied to her"); Adams u Nolan, 962 F2d 791,
794 (8th Cir 1992) (holding that the plaintiff demonstrated that some officers with off the
job injuries or conditions other than pregnancy in fact were given light duty assignments
to accommodate their condition); EEOC u Ackerman, Hood & McQueen, Inc, 956 F2d
944, 948 (10th Cir 1992) (holding that the "clear language of the PDA requires the court
to compare treatment between pregnant persons and 'other persons not so affected but
similar in their ability or inability to work"').
16 See notes 14 and 15.
17 See Brigid Schulte, New Statistics: Pregnancy Discrimination Claims Hit Low-
Wage Workers Hardest, (Washington Post Aug 4, 2014), online at http: //www.
washingtonpost.com/blogs/she-the-people/wp/2014/08/05/new-statistics-pregnancy-
discrimination-claims-hit-low-wage-workers-hardest/ (visited Oct 18, 2014); see also
Brigid Schulte, Discrimination Against Pregnant Workers Has Been Rising, Report Says,
(Washington Post June 17, 2013), online at http: //articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-06-
17/local/40028040 1_pregnant-workers-pregnancy-discrimination-equal-employment-
opportunity-commission (visited Oct 18, 2014); Martin, et al, It Shouldn't Be a Heavy Lift
(cited in note 1).
18 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC Issues Updated Enforcement
Guidance On Pregnancy Discrimination and Related Issues (July 14, 2014), online at
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/7-14-14.cfm (visited Oct 18, 2014).
19 See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission Strategic Enforcement Plan FY 2013 2016 § III.B (December
17, 2012), online at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/sep.cfm (visited Oct 18, 2014).
20 See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC Enforcement Guidance
on Pregnancy Discrimination and Related Issues, Overview of Statutory Protections
(July 14, 2014), online at http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/pregnancy-guidance.cfm
(visited Oct 18, 2014).
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The EEOC's new guidance is the only comprehensive
update since the first pregnancy discrimination manual was
published over 30 years ago. 21 It lays out the essential PDA
requirements that an employer may not discriminate against an
employee on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions and that women affected by pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions must be treated the
same as other persons similar in their ability or inability to
work. 22 Despite the updated guidance, the EEOC will continue
to struggle in light of the existing circuit split. The first step
requires resolving the circuit split to provide a predictable and
clear legal standard. 23 Therefore, this Comment provides timely
insight into the complicated issue of an employer's
accommodation responsibility to its pregnant employees.
This Comment contends that while the majority's
application of the PDA is facially neutral, it allows for pregnant
women to be discriminated against-contrary to the purpose of
the statute. The minority view application facilitates the
statute's intended result: one where pregnant women are not
discriminated against. Thus, this Comment argues that the
term "similarly situated" is best interpreted to mean another
individual of the same ability in the present moment-as long as
the employee met the required job ability level at the time of
hiring and the injury is only temporary. Using this comparator
group is better because it remains truest to Congress's
legislative intent to eliminate pregnancy discrimination.
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a brief
history of the PDA.2 4 Part II explains how a plaintiff can
establish a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination
utilizing the McDonnell DouglaS25 teSt. 2 6 Part III introduces the
21 See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC Issues Updated
Enforcement Guidance (cited in note 18).
22 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC Enforcement Guidance § I
(cited in note 19).
23 On July 1, 2014, the Supreme Court granted writ of certiorari for a Fourth
Circuit case, Young u United Parcel Service. See Young u United Parcel Service, 134 S Ct
374 (2013). In Young, the Fourth Circuit held that an employee injured off the job with a
similar ability is the only acceptable comparator for a pregnant employee. Young, 707
F3d at 450-51. See notes 157-164 and accompanying text. This case provides an avenue
for the Supreme Court to resolve the current split.
24 See notes 29-83 and accompanying text.
21 McDonnell Douglas Corp u Green, 411 US 792, 802 (1973).
26 See notes 84-117 and accompanying text.
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circuit split and analyzes each side's interpretation, application,
and results. 27 Part IV examines why the minority rule is more
reflective of the PDA's objectives, explores why similarly
situated is best understood to mean another employee with a
similar ability or inability to work, and advocates adopting this
definition as a solution to the circuit split.28
I. SETTING THE STAGE: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE LAW
UNDERLYING PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION
To reach a fuller understanding of the PDA and the
conditions that led to its adoption, this Section outlines relevant
federal laws addressing pregnancy discrimination and the
principal Supreme Court case. After reviewing the history
leading to the PDA's adoption, this part will discuss the PDA's
key language. This Section then concludes by reviewing the
Supreme Court's primary interpretation of the PDA in
California Federal Savings & Loan Association v Guerra,29
where the Court held that the PDA is a statutory floor, or
minimum standard, for admissible treatment of pregnant
employees.30
A. Federal Treatment of Pregnancy Discrimination in
Employment before the PDA
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 "to provide
equal access to the job market for both men and women" without
discrimination based on an individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin. 31 The Equal Employment Opportunity Act
(EEOA) of 1972 aimed to further bolster the government's
powers for eliminating discrimination in employment. 32
Specifically, the EEOA enabled the EEOC to bring federal
lawsuits to enforce Title VII guarantees. 33 Also in 1972, the
EEOC amended its guidelines to require that disabilities related
27 See notes 118-219 and accompanying text.
28 See notes 220-269 and accompanying text.
29 479 US 272 (1987).
so Id at 280, 285.
s Diaz u Pan American World Airways, Inc, 442 F2d 385, 386 (5th Cir 1971).
32 See Richard Nixon, Statement About Signing the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972 (The American Presidency Project Mar 25, 1972), online at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3358 (visited Oct 18, 2014).
" See id.
570 [ 2014
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to pregnancy be covered by any health insurance, temporary
disability insurance, or sick leave associated with employment. 34
Over the next three years the courts heard several
challenges to the EEOC's guidelines. These cases determined
whether an employee could claim employment discrimination in
violation of Title VII. Employees sued on the ground that the
employer's sickness and disability benefits plans were not paid
in connection with absences arising from conditions attendant to
pregnancy, childbirth, or childrearing. All six Federal Courts of
Appeals that considered the issue agreed with the EEOC's view
that Title VII prohibited discrimination in employment based on
pregnancy. 35 However, in 1976 the Supreme Court overruled
both the unanimous appellate courts and these guidelines.
B. Gilbert: The Supreme Court Overrules EEOC Guidelines
and the Appellate Courts
In 1976, the Supreme Court in General Electric Co v
Gilbert 36 considered whether an employer's disability plan that
did not cover disabilities arising from pregnancy violated Title
VII.37 Despite a vigorous dissent, the Court held that a disability
plan that did not cover pregnancy-related disabilities does not
violate Title VII.38 In doing so, the Court reversed six
unanimous appellate courts and invalidated the EEOC
guidelines. The Court emphasized that without the plaintiffs'
making the requisite showing of gender-based effects of the plan
either by the terms of the plan or the effects of the plan, no sex
based discrimination could be found. 39 Relying on Geduldig u
34 The guideline provides that "[d]isabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions, for all job-related purposes, shall be treated the
same as disabilities caused or contributed to by other medical conditions, under any
health or disability insurance or sick leave plan available in connection with
employment." See 29 CFR § 1604.10(b) (1972).
" See General Electric Co u Gilbert, 429 US 125, 147 (1976) (Brennan dissenting);
for the specific appellate cases, see also Communications Workers of America v American
Telephone and Telegraph Co, 513 F2d 1024, 1032 (2d Cir 1975); Wetzel v Liberty Mutual
Insurance Co, 511 F2d 199, 208-09 (3d Cir 1975); Gilbert u General Electric Co, 519 F2d
661, 667 (4th Cir 1975); Tyler u Vickery, 517 F2d 1089, 1105 (5th Circuit 1975); Satty v
Nashuille Gas Co, 522 F2d 850, 855 (6th Cir 1975); Hutchinson v Lake Oswego School
District, 519 F2d 961, 968 (9th Cir 1975).
429 US 125 (1976).
1 Id at 127-28.
"' Id at 145-46.
39 Id at 135-37.
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Aiello,40 which upheld a similar disability plan against a
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection challenge, the Gilbert
Court concluded that removing pregnancy from the list of
compensable disabilities was not discrimination on the basis of
sex.4 1 Thus, by viewing the employer's disability plan as
representing a gender-free assignment of risks, the Court found
the lone exclusion of pregnancy is not a violation of Title VII
since all other disabilities were mutually covered for both
sexes.42
As for the EEOC guidelines, the Court discussed the type of
deference they should receive at length. 43 Specifically, the court
applied Skidmore deference, which means that an
administrative agency's interpretative rules deserve deference
according to their persuasiveness.4 4 The Court seemed prepared
to apply deference to the EEOC guidelines when it remarked
that they are "entitled to consideration in determining
legislative intent."4 5 However, the Court still invalidated the
entirety of the EEOC's guidelines pertaining to disability
coverage for pregnancy.4 6
In contrast, Justice Brennan, writing for the dissent, called
for analyzing the General Electric disability plan under a
different framework: one that focused upon the risks excluded
from the otherwise comprehensive program and the purported
justifications for such exclusions.4 7 Thus, when adopting the
"plaintiffs' perception of the plan as a sex-conscious process
40 417 US 484 (1974).
41 See General Electric, 429 US at 133-36.
42 Id at 136.
43 Id at 140-45.
44 The Gilbert majority explained that Skidmore has the most comprehensive
statement of the role of interpretative rulings; Skidmore reads as follows:
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the
Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason
of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of
such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness
evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
persuade, if lacking power to control.
See id, quoting Skidmore v Swift & Co, 323 US 134, 140 (1944).
41 See General Electric, 429 US at 141-43.
46 Id at 143-46.
47 Id at 147 (Brennan dissenting).
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expressive of the secondary status of women in the company's
labor force," the effects of the unequal exclusion of pregnancy
became apparent.4 8 Brennan argued that the majority failed to
consider two sets of the plan's effects that demonstrated the
plan's prima facie violation of Title VII.49 A proper analysis
required allowing the plaintiff to make a showing that the
facially neutral classification has the effect of discriminating
against members of a defined class, which requires applying the
Supreme Court's McDonnell Douglas test.50 The McDonnell
Douglas test is critical to the PDA's application today.
Generally, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework
sets forth the framework for Title VII disparate treatment
claims; it will be analyzed in depth in Part II. Additionally,
Justice Brennan's emphasis of the shallowness of the majority's
under-inclusive application is a key concept that will be explored
in Part III.
C. Public Response to Gilbert and the Quick Congressional
Adoption of the PDA
Following the Supreme Court's momentous decision, there
was a large public response and intense lobbying from activist
groups.51 The same day that the Gilbert decision was
announced, ACLU attorney Susan Dellar Ross and International
Union of Electrical Workers Association General Counsel Ruth
Weyand began organizing support to amend Title VII and
invalidate the Supreme Court's ruling.52 The ensuing coalition of
more than 200 organizations established a drafting committee
that led the efforts that shaped the PDA. 53
48 Id atl52-55.
49 See General Electric, 429 US at 155 ("General Electric's disability program has
three divisible sets of effects. First, the plan covers all disabilities that mutually afflict
both sexes. . . . Second, the plan insures against all disabilities that are male-specific or
have a predominant impact on males. Finally, all female-specific and female-impacted
disabilities are covered, except for the most prevalent, pregnancy.... [T]he EEOC and
plaintiffs rely upon the unequal exclusion manifested in effects two and three to pinpoint
an adverse impact on women.").
5o See id at 153 n 6, 154-55.
" See Widiss, 46 UC Davis L Rev at 993 (cited in note 11).
52 Id.
" Id. See also David S. Cohen, The Stubborn Persistence of Sex Segregation, 20
Colum J Gender & L 51, 63-67 (2011).
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The PDA's legislative history gives insight into Congress's
original intentions of the Civil Rights Act and the intended
effect of the PDA. The House Education and Labor Committee
recognized the confusion the Supreme Court encountered when
interpreting the Civil Rights Act of 1964.54 Specifically,
Congress determined that the dissent correctly applied the
EEOC "as a reasonable interpretation and implementation of
the broad social objectives of Title VII."55 Congress recognized
that amending the Civil Rights Act would not reflect new
legislation or affect changes in practices, costs, or benefits
beyond Title VII.56 Instead, "the narrow approach utilized by the
bill is to eradicate confusion by expressly broadening the
definition of sex discrimination in Title VII to include
pregnancy-based discrimination." 57 The Committee notes
explained that Congress needed to clarify its original intent to
avoid "an intolerable potential trend in employment practices"
that would follow if the Supreme Court's interpretation of Title
VII were allowed to stand.5 8
The House Report specifically explained that the proposed
legislation "does not require employers to treat pregnant
employees in any particular manner . . . . H.R. 6075 in no way
requires the institution of any new programs where none
currently exist."5 9 This view indicated that the PDA precluded
distinctions that negatively affected pregnant women, but did
not mandate preferential treatment of pregnant women.
However, the report also emphasized that "H.R. 6075
unmistakably reaffirms that sex discrimination includes
discrimination based on pregnancy, and specifically defines
standards which require that pregnant workers be treated the
same as other employees on the basis of their ability or inability
to work." 0 Furthermore, the Act did not foreclose the possibility
that employees could voluntarily provide benefits to pregnant
workers that were not available to other temporarily disabled
14 See HR Rep No 95-948 at 2 (cited in note 9).
5 Id.
1 Id at 3-4.
1 Id at 4.
"' See HR Rep No 95-948 at 4 (cited in note 9).
'9 Id. See also S Rep No 95-331, 95th Cong, 1st Sess 41 (1977) (remarks of Senator
Williams).
60 HR Rep No 95-948 at 3 (cited in note 9).
574 [ 2014
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workers.6 1 This view denoted that the PDA would not function
as a pure prohibition on differentiating between pregnant and
nonpregnant employees.
President Carter signed the PDA into law on October 31,
1978.62 The PDA amends the Civil Rights Act of 1964 such that
discrimination "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" includes
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions. 63 In pertinent part, it provides:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex"
include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis
of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions;
and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions shall be treated the same for all
employment-related purposes, including receipt of
benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons
not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to
work, and nothing in section 2000e-2(h) of this title shall
be interpreted to permit otherwise.64
The first clause65 is a definition without any additional
substantive requirements. Thus, the first clause simply defines
the protected classes that can affirmatively bring suit under
Title VII. 66 As a result, the language of the first clause may be
substituted for "sex" in any other portion of Title VII. The second
clause, 67 hereinafter, the "same treatment" clause, creates a
distinct substantive standard that employers must satisfy. 68
Specifically, the same treatment clause requires that employers
61 Id at 4.
62 Pregnancy Disability Amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 99
Labor Rel Rptr 19, 3 (1978).
6 42 USC § 2000e(k) (2012).
64 Id.
£' The first clause reads, "The terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include,
but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions." 42 USC § 2000e(k) (2012).
66 See Deborah L. Brake and Joanna L. Grossman, Unprotected Sex: The Pregnancy
Discrimination Act at 35, 21 Duke J Gender L & Pol 67, 76 (2013).
£7 The second clause reads, "[w]omen affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes,
including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so
affected but similar in their ability or inability to work, and nothing in section 703(h) of
this title shall be interpreted to permit otherwise." 42 USC § 2000e(k).
£8 See Brake and Grossman, 21 Duke J Gender L & Pol at 77 (cited in note 66).
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treat pregnant employees the same as other employees with
similar abilities. 69 Congress explained "'same treatment' may
include employer practices of transferring workers to lighter
assignments, requiring employees to be examined by company
doctors or other practices, so long as the requirements and
benefits are administered equally for all workers in terms of
their actual ability to perform work."7 0 This same treatment
definition is integral to the current interpretation debate
because it elucidates the types of treatment Congress envisioned
the PDA encompassing.
D. The Supreme Court's Interpretation of the PDA as a Benefit
Floor in California Federal Savings
Following the PDA's enactment, a circuit split developed
regarding what type of coverage the PDA allowed and required.
In 1987, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in California
Federal Savings71 to consider whether the PDA preempted a
state statute that required employers to provide leave and
reinstatement to employees disabled by pregnancy. 72 California
Federal Savings proved a difficult case because it enabled the
Court to address whether pregnancy could be treated more
favorably than other disabilities. 73 The Court found that the
Congressional Reports, as well as Congress's debates and
hearings clearly exhibited Congress's intent for the PDA "to
provide relief for working women and to end discrimination
against pregnant workers."74 As clarification, the Court
explicitly stated its belief that Congress intended for the same
treatment clause to overrule the Court's holding in Gilbert and
"to illustrate how discrimination against pregnancy is to be
remedied." 75 Furthermore, in California Federal Savings the
Court held that the similarly situated language of the PDA gives
69 See Daniela M. de la Piedra, Flirting with the PDA: Congress Must Give Birth to
Accommodation Rights That Protect Pregnant Working Women, 17 Colum J Gender & L
275, 292 (2008) ("The Sixth Circuit has reasoned that the PDA mandates pregnant
employees be treated the same as non-pregnant employees similarly situated in their
ability to work, regardless of how or where the limitations arose.").
70 See HR Rep No 95-948 at 5 (cited in note 9).
7' 479 US 272 (1987).
72 Id at 274-75.
7 See Widiss, 46 UC Davis L Rev at 1004 (cited in note 11).
74 California Federal Savings, 479 US at 285-86.
7 Id at 285.
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employers the freedom to treat pregnant women the same as
other non-pregnant persons but similar in their ability or
inability to work. 76
The majority thoroughly explored the PDA's legislative
history and highlighted that the PDA's thrust is to "guarantee
women the basic right to participate fully and equally in the
workforce, without denying them the fundamental right to full
participation in family life."77 In light of that, "employers are
free to give comparable benefits to other disabled employees," 78
which would amount to treating pregnant workers no better
than other workers who are "similar in their ability or inability
to work."79 Thus, the Court held that "Congress intended the
PDA to be 'a floor beneath which pregnancy disability benefits
may not drop-not a ceiling above which they may not rise."'80
Additionally, the Court highlighted that if "Congress had
intended to prohibit preferential treatment" then it would have
extended its conversations to discuss the intention to expressly
forbid preferential treatment.81 Therefore, the PDA functions as
a benefit floor and does not preclude more expansive state law. 82
The concept of the PDA as a floor is critical to its application
today and a concept that will be analyzed in depth in Part IV.83
II. ESTABLISHING A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF PREGNANCY
DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII: APPLYING THE McDONNELL
DOUGLAS TEST
Before PDA interpretations can be properly explored, it is
important to understand the legal test applied in pregnancy
discrimination cases. As noted by Justice Brennan in Gilbert,84
the Supreme Court and every Court of Appeals have established
how a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of pregnancy
discrimination.8 5 Generally, under Title VII, this occurs in one of
7 Id at 291.
7 Id at 289, quoting 123 Cong Rec 29658 (1977).
78 California Federal Savings, 479 US at 291.
79 Id.
80 Id at 285.
81 Id at 287 (emphasis original).
82 California Federal Savings, 479 US at 285.
"' See Part IV.
84 429 US at 154-55. See also Part I.B.
"' Gilbert, 429 US at 154-55.
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three ways: (1) by presenting direct evidence of discrimination;
(2) by presenting statistical evidence of disparate treatment; or
(3) by establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under the
McDonnell Douglas86 test.87 Due to the difficulties establishing
evidence of direct discrimination or statistical evidence of
disparate treatment, most cases proceed under the McDonnell
Douglas test. Each circuit applies the same test with slight
variations in the language.88
In McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green,89 the plaintiff
explicitly complained that he was discharged from employment
for racial, rather than licit, motives.90 The complaint focused
primarily on the effects of the employer's decision on the
plaintiff, so the case only tangentially considered the policy's
effects on an entire class of employees.91 Despite this, the Court
held that a prima facie violation of Title VII could still be proved
without affirmatively demonstrating that purposeful
discrimination occurred. 92 Then the Court set forth the basic
allocations of burdens of proof for Title VII cases where statistics
or direct evidence are unavailable to allege discriminatory
treatment.93
The McDonnell Douglas test proceeds in three parts: (1)
"the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the preponderance of
the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination;" 94 (2) "if the
plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie case, the burden
shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate,
" 411 US at 802.
87 The McDonnell Douglas test "set forth the basic allocation of burdens and order
of presentation of proof in a Title VII case alleging discriminatory treatment." Texas
Department of Community Affairs v Burdine, 450 US 248, 252 (1981). See also Urbano,
138 F3d at 206 (noting that "a plaintiff may prove her claim either through direct
evidence, statistical proof, or the [McDonnell Douglas] test"); Ensley-Gaines, 100 F3d at
1224 (same).
For example, the Fourth Circuit first considers if the plaintiff has shown any
direct discrimination evidence and then applies the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework. See Young, 707 F3d at 446. The Seventh Circuit allows plaintiffs to
demonstrate either through the same indirect method of the other circuits or by a direct
method that considers circumstantial evidence. See Serednyj, 656 F3d at 548-51;
Troupe, 20 F3d at 736; Piraino, 84 F3d at 274.
89 411 US 792 (1973).
90 Id at 796.
91 Id at 805.
92 Id at 802.
93 See McDonnell Douglas, 411 US at 802-03.
94 Texas Department, 450 US at 248.
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nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection;"95
(3) "should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must
then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant
were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for
discrimination."9 6 Since courts generally use the McDonnell
Douglas framework to analyze Title VII cases where a plaintiff
lacks direct evidence of intentional discrimination, the burden-
shifting test is readily utilized in PDA claims.97 The rest of this
section explains the previously noted three prongs of the
McDonnell Douglas test in detail.
A. Prong One: Plaintiff-Employee's Burden of Proof Requires
Demonstrating Four Elements
At the prima facie stage, the McDonnell Douglas analysis
only requires a plaintiff to raise an inference of discrimination-
not to dispel the non-discriminatory reasons subsequently
proffered by the defendant.98 How a plaintiff demonstrates a
prong-one prima facie case is a matter of interpretation.
Plaintiffs must demonstrate four elements to satisfy prong one:
"(1) membership in a protected class; (2) satisfactory job
performance; (3) adverse employment action; and (4) that
similarly-situated employees outside the protected class received
more favorable treatment."99 Generally, all courts applying the
McDonnell Douglas test require that the first three elements be
met in this exact form.100 Different courts allow some variation
for what satisfies the fourth element requirement that another
employee be a similarly situated comparator component, but the
result is the same. 101
95 Id (internal quotation and citation omitted).
96 Id.
97 See EEOC u Horizon/CMSHealthcare Corp, 220 F3d 1184, 1192 (10th Cir 2000).
98 See MacDonald v Eastern Wyoming Mental Health Center, 941 F2d 1115, 1119
(10th Cir 1991).
99 Young, 707 F3d at 449-50, quoting Gerner u County of Chesterfield, 674 F3d 264,
266 (4th Cir 2012).
100 See Arizanouska v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, 682 F3d 698, 702 (7th Cir 2012).
101 Compare Spicey, 196 F3d at 1312-13 (finding that "pregnant employees must be
treated the same as every other employee with a non-occupational injury") and Serednyj,
656 F3d at 551 ("Employees are similarly situated if they are 'directly comparable to her
in all material respects' . . . . A plaintiff need not show complete identity with a proposed
comparator, but she must show 'substantial similarity."'), with Latowski v Northwoods
Nursing Center, 2013 US App LEXIS 25738, *14-17 (6th Cir) (holding that it did not
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B. Prong Two: The Burden Shifts to Defendant-Employer to
Demonstrate a Nondiscriminatory Rationale for the
Employment Decision
If an employee successfully proves a prima facie case of sex
discrimination based on a pregnancy-related condition, the
burden shifts to the employer "to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason" for the employer's decision. 102 With
this shift, the employer's burden is one of production, not
persuasion.103 It is sufficient that the employer's evidence raise
a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against
the plaintiff."10 4 To satisfy this burden, the employer must
clearly delineate its reasons for the employment decision. 105 The
provided explanation must be "legally sufficient to justify a
judgment for the [employer]." 106 The Supreme Court refused to
attempt to "detail every matter which fairly could be recognized
as a reasonable basis" for an employment decision.107 However,
an employee's unlawful conduct, a written policy against
accommodation for employees injured off the job, and an
economics-driven policy change have been found sufficient
explanations for employment decisions initially deemed
discriminatory.1 0 8 For example, the Eighth Circuit upheld the
accommodation policy of an employer who changed it for
economic reasons.109 This example will be discussed further in
Part III.B.2.
matter if one employee's medical condition was work-related and the pregnant
employee's was not; the essential similarity must be the ability of the employee to
perform her work).
102 McDonnell Douglas, 411 US at 802.
'0s Horizon, 220 F3d at 1191; Texas Department, 450 US at 255-56 ("Placing this
burden of production on the defendant thus serves simultaneously to meet the plaintiffs
prima facie case by presenting a legitimate reason for the action and to frame the factual
issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to
demonstrate pretext."). To rebut the presumption of discrimination, an employer must
produce evidence that the employment decision was made for a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 US at 802.
104 Texas Department, 450 US at 254.
10 Id at 255.
106 Id.
107 See McDonnell Douglas, 411 US at 802-03.
108 Id at 803; Piraino, 84 F3d at 276; Walker v Fred Nesbit Distributing Co, 156 Fed
Appx 880, 884-85 (8th Cir 2005).
109 See Walker, 156 Fed Appx at 884-85.
580 [ 2014
THE RESURGENCE OF THE MATERNAL WALL
C. Prong Three: The Plaintiff-Employee Can Refute the
Employer's Justification as Pretextual
Under prong three, the burden again shifts to the employee
to show pretext by (1) demonstrating "that the proffered reason
is factually false" 110 or (2) "by showing the defendant's proffered
non-discriminatory explanations for its actions are so
incoherent, weak, inconsistent, or contradictory that a rational
factfinder could conclude [the explanations are] unworthy of
belief."111 Relevant evidence of pretext includes facts regarding
the employer's treatment of the employee, the employer's
general policy and practice with respect to pregnant employees,
the strength of the plaintiff's prima facie case, and the probative
value of the proof that the employer's explanation is false. 112
D. The McDonnell Douglas Test as Applied in the PDA Context
Due to the difficulty of showing a similarly situated
employee to the plaintiff, many times the issues revolve around
the first step of the McDonnell Douglas test. 113 A similarly
situated comparator ensures that all the employee's other
qualities are the same, which reveals when discrimination based
on pregnancy occurred. 114 The standard is a "flexible, common-
sense one," 115 but still requires a pregnant employee to identify
a comparator that is outside her protected class of pregnant
employees. 116 Most courts hold that employers are not required
to make accommodations that are not made for other employees
n0 Tabor u Hilti, Inc, 703 F3d 1206, 1218 (10th Cir 2013).
n. Conroy v Vilsack, 707 F3d 1163, 1172 (10th Cir 2013). See also Texas
Department, 450 US at 256 (Plaintiff may demonstrate pretext "indirectly by showing
that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.").
112 See McDonnell Douglas, 411 US at 804-05; Tysinger u Police Department of City
of Zanesville, 463 F3d 569, 576 (6th Cir 2006).
.s Most often a pregnant employee is unable to point to a similarly situated
employee outside her protected class who was treated more favorably. See, for example,
Arizanouska, 682 F3d at 702. The Seventh Circuit requires a comparator to be an
employee who was not subject to the employer's modified work policy in the same way as
the pregnant employee. See Serednyj, 656 F3d at 551 ("Employees are similarly situated
if they are 'directly comparable to her in all material respects' ..... A plaintiff need not
show complete identity with a proposed comparator, but she must show 'substantial
similarity.'), quoting Patterson u Avery Dennison Corp, 281 F3d 676, 680 (7th Cir 2002)
and Radue v Kimberly-Clark Corp, 219 F3d 612, 617-18 (7th Cir 2000).
114 See Arizanouska, 682 F3d at 703; Young, 707 F3d at 451.
n. See Henry v Jones, 507 F3d 558, 564 (7th Cir 2007).
n1 Id.
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injured off the job, but it is unclear where the dividing line lies
between pregnancy and other off the job conditions, such as
sport injuries, attempted suicides, venereal diseases, injuries
resulting from a fight, and elective cosmetic surgery. 117 This
confusion has given rise to the prominent circuit split discussed
below.
III. PDA CIRCUIT SPLIT: INTERPRETING THE SAME TREATMENT
CLAUSE IN ACCOMMODATION CLAIMS
Following the Supreme Court's holding in California
Federal Savings,118 a circuit split developed regarding the
interpretation of the "similar in their ability or inability to work"
clause' 19 in the PDA. 120 It is generally accepted that the
comparison is "between pregnant and nonpregnant workers, not
between men and women;" 12 1 the debate surrounds defining and
interpreting similarly situated and ability level. Federal courts
of appeals disagree as to what type of treatment the same
treatment clause1 22 requires when it comes to accommodation
claims stemming from a "denial of a request from an employee
that standard workplace procedures be modified in her favor." 123
At the heart of this debate lie contrary definitions of who
qualifies as a suitable, similarly situated comparator for the
pregnant employer as required by the same treatment
clause 124 -either an employee who was injured off the job or an
employee similar in her ability or inability to work. This section
will describe the major accommodation cases on each side of this
split.
117 See General Electric, 429 US at 151.
11 479 US at 286.
119 See note 67.
120 The Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have taken the majority view
that the only appropriate comparators are those who became disabled off the job. See
generally Young, 707 F3d at 437; Urbano, 138 F3d at 204; Troupe, 20 F3d at 734; Spicey,
196 F3d at 1309. The Sixth and Tenth Circuits comprise the minority view that any
worker that is similar in his or her ability or inability to work should receive the same
treatment. See generally Ensley-Gaines, 100 F3d at 1220; Ackerman, 956 F2d at 944.
121 See Ackerman, 956 F2d at 948.
122 See note 67.
123 Widiss, 46 UC Davis L Rev at 1018 (cited in note 11).
124 See note 67.
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A. Majority Approach: The Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and
Eleventh Circuits Require an Off-the-Job Injury
Comparator
The Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits hold that
the only appropriate comparators for pregnant employees are
those employees who became temporarily disabled by an off the
job injury. 125 In other words, the majority rule holds that an
employee injured on the job is not a suitable comparator.126 To
better understand this application, the primary accommodation
cases from each circuit in the majority rule shall be analyzed
chronologically.
Early accommodation cases under the PDA upheld the
practice of distinguishing between on the job and off the job
injuries. 127 An on the job injury encompasses any injury that
occurred at work or performing work related duties while off the
job refers to incidents that happened outside of the workplace
and unrelated to work. 128 The first circuit to consider this issue
was the Fifth Circuit, and it applied this rationale when
addressing a pregnant worker's lift restriction in Urbano u
Continental Airlines, Inc. 129 The employer, an airline, followed a
transitional duty policy that granted light-duty assignments
only to employees who suffered an occupational injury.130 Light-
duty assignments are modifications to allow a pregnant woman
to continue working, such as reassignment to alternate
positions, more frequent breaks, or enabling the employee to sit
when justified by a particular woman's medical condition. 131 Any
employee with a non-occupational injury or illness could apply
121 See Young, 707 F3d at 449 (holding that where a policy treats pregnant workers
and nonpregnant workers alike, the employer has complied with the PDA); Urbano, 138
F3d at 208 (holding that comparing a pregnant employee with an individual injured off
the job is a demand for preferential treatment, which is not required by the PDA);
Troupe, 20 F3d at 738 (holding that the PDA does not "require employers to offer
maternity leave or take other steps to make it easier for pregnant women to work");
Spicey, 196 F3d at 1312-13 (finding that "pregnant employees must be treated the same
as every other employee with a non-occupational injury").
126 See Reeves v Swift Transportation Co, 446 F3d 637, 638-39 (6th Cir 2006);
Spicey, 196 F3d at 1312-13; Urbano, 138 F3d at 208.
127 See note 35 and accompanying text.
128 See Tysinger, 463 F3d at 574.
129 138 F3d 204 (5th Cir 1998).
"s Id at 205.
.s. Joanna L. Grossman, Pregnancy, Work, and the Promise of Equal Citizenship, 98
Georgetown L J 567, 625 (2010).
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for a less physically demanding position through the company's
normal assignment system, which made assignments based on
seniority. 132 The employee argued that since pregnant employees
and nonpregnant employees who were injured off the job have
the same ability or inability to work, they should be treated in
the same manner. 133 However, the court rejected this. 134
In analyzing the company's treatment of the pregnant
employee and her medically imposed twenty-pound lift
restriction, the Fifth Circuit held that the employer treated her
the same as "any other worker who was injured off the job." 135
Specifically, the court found that to demonstrate discrimination,
the ideal comparator for a pregnant employee is another
employee with a non-occupational injury who received different
treatment. 136 Since the pregnant employee failed to show such
disparate treatment, the court held that it was not a violation of
the PDA for the employer to deny light duty assignments to
pregnant employees even though employees who were injured on
the job were provided with such assignments. 137 The Fifth
Circuit further stated that "Urbano's claim is thus not a request
for relief from discrimination, but rather a demand for
preferential treatment; it is a demand not satisfied by the
PDA." 138
The Eleventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Spivey
v Beverly Enterprises, Inc. 1 39 In Spivey, the pregnant employee
worked as a certified nurse's assistant, which required her to be
able to lift patients. 140 However, during her pregnancy Spivey's
doctor imposed a medical restriction against lifting more than 25
pounds.14 1 After the employee received this restriction, Beverly
Enterprises informed Spivey that she "would not be provided
with an accommodation due to the company's modified duty
policy." 142 The court upheld the accommodation denial, noting
132 Id.
1ss Urbano, 138 F3d at 207.
134 Id at 206.
135 Id.
136 Id.
1s7 Urbano, 138 F3d at 208.
138 Id.
139 196 F3d 1309 (11th Cir 1999).
140 Id at 1311.
141 Id.
142 Id.
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that under the PDA, an employer must ignore an employee's
pregnancy and treat her "as well as it would have if she were not
pregnant." 143 Even when an employer ignores a woman s
pregnancy, that employer still has an employee with a limitation
that did not arise from an off the job injury. 144 Thus, the court
explicitly applied the Fifth Circuit's reasoning from Urbano.145
As such, the court concluded that the correct comparison was
between the pregnant employee and other employees who
suffered non-occupational disabilities, not between the pregnant
employee and other employees who were injured off the job.14 6
The Eleventh Circuit also noted that holding otherwise would
require employers to give preferential treatment to pregnant
employees, since employers do not give accommodations to other
employees injured off the job.14 7
In Arizanouska v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, 14 8 the Seventh
Circuit also addressed an employer policy that did not allow for
accommodations of light duty, temporary alternative duty, or
reassignment for individuals with non-disability medical
conditions-including pregnancy. 14 9 Arizanovska-the pregnant
employee-worked as a stocker, which required that an
employee be able to lift up to fifty pounds. 150 However, once
pregnant, Arizanoska had a medical restriction to not lift more
than ten pounds, which meant she could no longer perform the
essential lifting function of her stocker position. 15 1 Wal-Mart
refused to grant Arizanovska any accommodation, and instead
told her to take a leave of absence until she could meet the
stocker lift requirement. 152 The Seventh Circuit upheld
summary judgment for the employer because the employee
failed to identify "a similarly-situated employee outside her
protected class-i.e., non-pregnant." 153 The court explained that
the "purpose of the 'similarly-situated' comparator is to ensure
143 Spicey, 196 F3d at 1313, citing Piraino, 84 F3d at 274.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Spicey, 196 F3d at 1312.
148 682 F3d 698, 702 (7th Cir 2012).
149 Id at 701.
'5o Id at 700.
..' Id at 701.
112 Arizanouska, 682 F3d at 702.
15s Id at 703 (emphasis original).
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that all other variables are discounted so that discrimination
can be inferred."154 In other words, the Seventh Circuit
explained that evidence of an employer taking action against an
employee in a protected class, but not taking the same action
against a comparator employee who is not a member of that
class would enable a court to infer discrimination in the prima
facie stage.1 55 Without this comparator, the court refused to find
for the pregnant employee.
Most recently the Fourth Circuit considered the issue of
who is an acceptable comparator in Young v UPS.156 In Young,
the employee's pregnancy resulted in a restriction that
prevented her from lifting more than twenty pounds. This made
her unable to continue performing her usual job, so Young took
an unpaid extended leave of absence. 157 The employer, however,
maintained a policy that provided temporary alternate work to
employees that were "unable to perform their normal work
assignments due to an off the job injury."158 This policy allowed a
pregnant employee to continue working provided that she could
perform the essential functions of her job; a pregnant employee
would not be eligible for light duty work if a limitation arose
solely from her pregnancy. 159 Young argued that her employer's
policy offering limited light-duty work to those injured off the job
but not to pregnant workers violated the PDA's command to
treat pregnant employees the same "as other persons not so
affected but similar in their ability or inability to work." 160 The
Fourth Circuit held that a pregnant employee with a temporary
lifting restriction is not similar in her "ability or inability to
work" to an ADA-disabled employee, an employee who lost her
legal ability to drive her UPS vehicle, or an employee injured off
the job. 161 The court reasoned that accepting the plaintiff's
interpretation of the PDA would "[compel] employers to grant
pregnant employees a 'most favored nation' status with others
based on their ability to work, regardless of whether such status
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 707 F3d 437 (4th Cir 2013).
117 Id at 437-41.
"s Id at 439 (emphasis original).
19 Id at 440.
160 Young, 707 F3d at 445, quoting 42 USC § 2000e(k).
161 Id at 450.
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was available to the universe-male and female-of
nonpregnant employees." 162 The Fourth Circuit emphasized that
without an explicitly similarly situated employee who received
more favorable treatment, there was insufficient evidence to
establish pregnancy discrimination. 163
B. Minority Approach: The Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits
Require a Similar Ability Comparator
In contrast, the minority of circuits hold that the PDA
explicitly altered the discrimination analysis applicable in
pregnancy discrimination cases. 164 The Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth
Circuits have found that employees with the similar ability or
inability to work as a pregnant employee should be used as
appropriate comparators in accommodation actions. 165 The
minority grounds its reasoning in the same treatment clause1 66
of the PDA, which requires employers to treat pregnant women
the same as others "similar in their ability or inability to
work." 167 Thus the nature of the injury-on the job or off the
job-is irrelevant to determining if an employee is a suitable
comparator for establishing a prima facie discrimination case.
In Ensley-Gaines u Runyon, 168 the Sixth Circuit
contemplated which considerations are relevant to determining
when accommodations are necessary for a pregnant employee. 169
The employer, the Postal Service, maintained a policy allowing
an employee who was temporarily unable to perform her duties
to submit a written request for alternative assignments.170
Notably the policy made a distinction between light duty and
limited duty: "'[1]imited duty' is available to those workers
injured on the job, while 'light duty' is available to employees
162 Id at 446.
16s Id at 451.
164 See Ensley-Gaines, 100 F3d at 1226; Adams v Nolan, 962 F2d at 794.
165 See note 15.
166 See note 10 and accompanying text.
167 See Ensley-Gaines, 100 F3d at 1226 (finding that unlike the typical Title VII
requirement "that a plaintiff demonstrate that the employee who received more
favorable treatment be similarly situated 'in all respects,' the PDA requires only that the
employee be similar in his or her 'ability or inability to work"), quoting 42 USC
§ 2000e(k); accord Ackerman, 956 F2d at 948 (same).
168 100 F3d 1220 (6th Cir 1996).
169 Id at 1222.
170 Id.
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whose injuries are not employment-related." 171 The pregnant
employee argued that she was given light-duty status in name
only since she was not given an accommodation to allow her to
work a full eight-hour day. Additionally, the employee identified
a number of non-pregnant, temporarily disabled employees who
received more favorable treatment after requesting alternative
duties. 172
The amicus curiae brief emphasized the PDA's own bona
fide occupational qualification that "unless pregnant employees
differ from others 'in their ability or inability to work,' they must
be 'treated the same' as other employees 'for all employment-
related purposes."' 173 The Sixth Circuit agreed and rejected the
distinction between on the job and off the job injuries, holding
that such a distinction pertains to the "terms of employment, not
to an employee's ability or inability to work, as provided in the
PDA."174 In arriving at this conclusion, the Sixth Circuit
emphasized that the Supreme Court recognized that, "[t]he
second clause [of the PDA] could not be clearer: it mandates that
pregnant employees 'shall be treated the same for all
employment-related purposes' as nonpregnant employees
similarly situated with respect to their ability to work."175 The
court explained that "while Title VII generally requires that a
plaintiff demonstrate that the employee who received more
favorable treatment be similarly situated 'in all respects,' . . . the
PDA requires only that the employee be similar in his or her
'ability or inability to work."' 176 Thus, a comparator for use in
establishing a prima facie case must be similar in his ability to
complete the necessary work, but the source of the injury is
irrelevant. 177
The Eighth Circuit applied the same reasoning. In Adams v
Nolan,178 the pregnant employee served as a patrol officer.1 79
171 Id at 1222.
172 Ensley-Gaines, 100 F3d at 1223.
17s Brief of Amici Curiae Barbara Harvey, Elizabeth Larin, Mary Anne M.
Helveston, and Paul Denenfeld, Ensley-Gaines u Runyon, Civil Action No 95-1038, *3
(ED Mich filed May 6, 1996).
174 Ensley-Gaines, 100 F3d at 1226.
171 Id, quoting California Federal Sauings, 479 US at 297 (emphasis original).
176 Ensley-Gaines, 100 F3d at 1226.
177 Id at 1225.
178 962 F2d 791 (8th Cir 1992).
179 Id at 792.
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The police department's policy granted use of sick leave,
vacation leave, and/or other earned paid time off for employees
who suffered non-work related injury or illness, including
pregnancy, that caused temporary disability.180 Based on that
policy, the plaintiff's request for light duty work was denied.181
On appeal, the pregnant employee argued that she was passed
over for light duty assignments and thus met the requirements
for a prima facie case. 182 Despite reservations as to "whether the
leave policy itself even qualifies as a 'nondiscriminatory' basis
for defendants' actions," the Eighth Circuit applied the
McDonnell Douglas analysis. 183 Since the plaintiff demonstrated
that some officers with off the job injuries or conditions other
than pregnancy were in fact given light duty assignments to
accommodate their conditions, the burden shifted to the
employer to provide a reason for the decision.184 The police
department submitted that it denied plaintiff the light duty
assignment because it follows a specific policy.185 The plaintiff
then had the opportunity to demonstrate the employer's reason
was pretextual. 186 Since the exact light duty job was given to
another officer sharing the same circumstances as the plaintiff
except that his medical impairments were not pregnancy-
related, the Eighth Circuit held that the proffered reason for the
adverse action against the employee was a pretext for
intentional discrimination on the basis of sex. 187
In EEOC v Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp,188 the Tenth
Circuit confirmed the necessity of using a comparator who is
similarly situated in her ability or inability to work regardless of
where the injury was sustained. 189 The pregnant employees
worked for the Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corporation, a long-
term health care services provider. 190 Each had work
restrictions, including various limitations on the amount each
180 Id.
181 Id at 793.
182 Adams, 962 F2d at 793.
'8 Id at 794.
184 Id at 796.
'8 Id at 795.
18 Adams, 962 F2d at 796.
187 Id at 795-96.
188 220 F3d 1184 (10th Cir 2000).
189 Id at 1192.
190 Id at 1189.
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woman was allowed to lift, but could perform all duties of her job
except for heavy lifting.191 The employees argued that their
employer violated the PDA by refusing to place them in
modified-duty assignments. 192 In finding for the employees, the
court noted, "if a plaintiff is compared only to non-pregnant
employees injured off the job, her case would be 'short circuited'
at the prima facie stage and she would be denied the
opportunity to show that the policy ... is actually a pretext for
unlawful discrimination." 193 Thus at the prima facie stage, the
relevant consideration was "whether the employee has
introduced some evidence that she possesses the objective
qualifications necessary to perform the job sought."194
Accordingly, the court concluded that evidence that pregnant
women were treated differently than other temporarily disabled
employees, regardless of whether it was due to occupational or
non-occupational injury, was sufficient to satisfy the prima facie
stage under the McDonnell Douglas discrimination
framework. 195
The Eighth Circuit examined an accommodation policy
changed for economic reasons in Walker v Fred Nesbit
Distributing Co.196 The employer, a food distribution company,
allegedly adopted a policy change that only allowed
reassignment to light duty if the employee was injured off the
job. 197 Walker presented evidence of other employees who were
injured off the job and given subsequent accommodation. 198 In
response, Nesbit admitted that before Fall 2001 it allowed light
duty assignment for employees injured off the job, but that it
stopped providing accommodation for off the job injuries because
"it did not make 'economic sense' to pay two people to do the job
of one." 199 The pregnant employee argued that the policy change
was never put in writing and the company handbook was not
191 Id.
192 Horizon, 220 F3d at 1189.
193 Id at 1195 n 7.
194 Id at 1193 (emphasis in original).
195 Id.
196 156 Fed Appx 880 (8th Cir 2005).
197 Id at 882.
198 Id at 883.
199 Id at 884.
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amended. 200 Furthermore, there were no other employee
requests for accommodations for off the job injuries between the
time of accommodation for the broken foot injury and the
pregnant employee's request, a period of seven months.201 The
court found for the employer and affirmed that an
accommodation policy change driven by economic considerations
is not pretextual. 202 Specifically, the court recognized that the
"jury apparently concluded that Nesbit was truthful in its
statement . . . to change its policy of [accommodation]" and that
a "reasonable jury could have believed that Nesbit had
implemented its new accommodation policy in the fall of 2001,
despite not committing the new policy to writing." 203 Although
the pregnant employee established a similarly situated group of
employees who were treated differently-that is, given
accommodations-despite their off the job injuries, 204 and the
pregnant employee was denied similar accommodations, the
employee did not prevail. 205 This case demonstrates the
difficulties that arise in pregnancy discrimination cases even
after establishing a similarly situated comparator.
More recently, in Latowski v Northwoods Nursing Center,206
the Sixth Circuit explicitly addressed the nature of the
comparator employee. 207 Latowski worked at Northwoods
Nursing Center assisting nursing home residents with daily
living activities. 208 During Latowski's pregnancy her doctor
implemented a lifting restriction of fifty pounds, which the
doctor relayed to Northwoods pursuant to its policy to get a note
for "anything medical." 2 09 In response, Northwoods informed
Latowski that she could no longer work because "[Northwoods]
would accommodate only restrictions resulting from work-
200 Walker, 156 Fed Appx at 885.
201 Id at 883-84.
202 Id at 884-85.
203 Id at 885.
204 Walker, 156 Fed Appx at 883-84 ("The district court stated that 'there is no
question that drivers injured off the job who could not fulfill the lifting requirements are
similarly situated to [Walker].").
201 Id at 885.
206 2013 US App LEXIS 25738 (6th Cir).
207 Id at *10-11.
208 Id at *2.
209 Id at *3.
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related incidents."210 When Latowski still reported to work,
another Northwoods nurse told Latowski that "she had
'resigned"' and a second letter from the Northwoods
administrator "accepted Latowski's 'resignation."' 2 1 1 Latowski
never resigned and emphasized that the Northwoods owners
made discriminatory comments to her, including that "her 'belly
would be in the way."' 2 12 Thus, Latowski argued that her
employer's facially nondiscriminatory policy still had a
discriminatory impact on her.2 13 Based on the discriminatory
comments and Latowski's satisfactory job performance tests, the
court held that the plaintiff satisfied the prima facie test. 214
Those same comments sufficiently rebutted her employer's
pretextual reasons for the employment decisions regarding the
plaintiff.215 The court found that the pregnant employee and the
other employee must be similarly situated in their ability to
work based on having a similar workplace limitation, such as a
lifting restriction. 216 Furthermore, it did not matter if one
employee's medical condition was work-related and the pregnant
employee's was not; the essential similarity must be the ability
of the employee to perform her work. 217
These two lines of interpretation exhibit a clear circuit split
over which type of employee can be used as a comparator
employee for a Title VII discrimination claim. As a review, the
majority of jurisdictions have held that employers that
accommodate pregnant employees in the same manner as other
employees injured off the job-but not on the job-are
pregnancy-blind and, therefore, valid under the PDA. 2 1 8
210 Latowski, 2013 US App LEXIS 25738 at *3.
211 Id at *5.
212 Id.
213 Id at *8-9.
214 Latowski, 2013 US App LEXIS 25738 at *9-14.
211 Id at *14-17.
216 Id at *11.
217 Id.
218 'The concept of pregnancy-blindness captures this right: An employer can treat
the pregnant woman as well or as badly as it treats anyone else, as long as it is blind to
her pregnancy as an independent variable." Joanna L. Grossman and Gillian L. Thomas,
Making Pregnancy Work: Overcoming the Pregnancy Discrimination Act's Capacity-
Based Model, 21 Yale J L & Feminism 15, 27 (2009). See also Troupe, 20 F3d at 738
(holding that "employers can treat pregnant women as badly as they treat similarly
affected but nonpregnant employees" and noting the court's "doubt that finding a
comparison group would be that difficult"); notes 14, 125-126 and accompanying text.
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Conversely, other courts have held that the "similarly situated"
analysis should compare a pregnant employee to any other
employee who has a similar ability or inability to perform the
job, including those who became temporarily disabled due to an
injury while on the job. 219 Resolving this split is of top
importance for enabling pregnant women to have full access to
Title VII pregnancy discrimination protections.
IV. PROPOSED RESOLUTION: USING A PLAIN MEANING
INTERPRETATION OF THE PDA's SAME TREATMENT CLAUSE
FULFILLS THE PURPOSE OF TITLE VII PROTECTION AGAINST
PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION
The PDA requires that employers treat pregnant women the
same as other similarly situated employees. 220 However, when
an injured employee and a pregnant employee are treated
differently, there exists much room for discrimination. This
discrimination against pregnant employees is exactly what the
PDA aims to prevent. 221 This section discusses why the correct
comparator does not consider injury location and instead focuses
on ability or inability to work. It then explores whether the
choice of comparator in this manner amounts to preferential
treatment and concludes it does not.
Specifically, Part A explores the structure and legislative
history of the PDA and why structural considerations
necessitate interpreting the PDA's second clause as requiring a
similar ability comparator. Part B explains why a similar ability
comparator does not amount to preferential treatment, identifies
likely counterarguments, and demonstrates why they do not
preclude this intended interpretation. Finally, Part C proposes
to eliminate the circuit split by allowing comparators that reflect
the ability level of the pregnant employee and removes the
current ambiguities.
219 See notes 164-167 and accompanying text.
220 See note 67 and accompanying text.
221 See Part I.C and I.D. See also Brake and Grossman, 21 Duke J Gender L & Pol at
77 (cited in note 66) (arguing that the PDA's second clause establishes "an independent
violation of the PDA if pregnant workers are treated worse than other workers similar in
their ability to work . . . [which] best matches the text and legislative history of the Act").
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A. Statute Structure and Legislative History Compel
Interpreting the Same Treatment Clause to Require a
Similar Ability Comparator
Since the legislative history demonstrates that Congress
intended for the PDA to ensure that pregnant woman are to be
treated the same as others on the basis of their ability or
inability to work, 222 it is unlikely that Congress would have left
pregnant women without a cause of action in cases where a
similarly able employee injured on the job exists, but a similarly
able employee injured off the job does not. In direct response to
Gilbert, Congress enacted the PDA to overturn Gilbert and
"establish a robust commitment to treating pregnancy at least
as well as other conditions that place comparable limitations on
employees." 223 Thus, the relevant consideration ought to be the
nature of the limitation-not the origin of the limitation. For
pregnant women, the on the job versus off the job injury
distinction offers a shallow differentiation since pregnancy is a
temporary life condition, as opposed to an injury occurring in a
specific location. Requiring a comparator who was injured off the
job does not satisfy the PDA's goal and puts women in an
inferior position given that establishing such a comparator is not
required by the second clause and can be extremely challenging,
particularly in small or new workplaces.
Current PDA interpretation gives much deference to the
idea that the PDA does not require preferential treatment-
especially the majority rule. 2 2 4 In fact, courts agree that the PDA
does not "impose an affirmative obligation on employers to grant
preferential treatment to pregnant women."225 Still, circuits that
have adopted the majority rule continue to be concerned about
preferential treatment. 226 While a valid concern, the majority's
222 "H.R. 6075 unmistakably reaffirms that sex discrimination includes
discrimination based on pregnancy, and specifically defines standards which require that
pregnant workers be treated the same as other employees on the basis of their ability or
inability to work." HR Rep No 95-948 at 3 (cited in note 9). See also notes 54-62 and
accompanying text.
223 See Widiss, 46 UC Davis L Rev at 1004 (cited in note 11).
224 See note 125.
221 See, for example, Urbano, 138 F3d at 207; see also California Federal Savings,
479 US at 287-88; Stout u Baxter Healthcare Corp, 282 F3d 856, 861 (5th Cir 2002); note
125.
226 See note 125.
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interpretation of the PDA's second clause 2 2 7 limits equal
treatment for pregnant women.
Further, the majority rule prevents the disparate impact
theory from operating as a backstop or absolute floor against
discrimination, which is what the Supreme Court required in
California Federal Savings.228 Notably, the PDA's legislative
history only discusses Congress's "intent not to require
preferential treatment."229 As noted, the Supreme Court
highlighted that if "Congress had intended to prohibit
preferential treatment" then it would have extended its
conversations to discuss the intention to expressly forbid
preferential treatment.230 The minority rule avoids this outcome
by requiring a comparator to be of the ability of the pregnant
employee. This recognizes both congressional intent and the
importance of a pregnant employee's ability to work while
avoiding discriminatory effects. Furthermore, the Act is silent as
to the location where an inability to work arose. The Court also
found that the Legislative Record supports the notion that the
PDA must only operate as a floor.231 The House Report
explained that the proposed legislation "does not require
employers to treat pregnant employees in any particular
manner . . . [and it] in no way requires the institution of any
new programs where none currently exist."2 32 Where a program
does exist, however, the PDA allows a pregnant employee to
benefit when coverage or accommodation is given to another
employee who is similar in ability or inability to work. 2 33 An
accommodation model for pregnant workers might take different
forms, but the fundamental goal is to enable capable pregnant
workers with similar abilities to other employees to continue
working.
227 See 67.
228 California Federal Savings, 479 US at 285. See also Grossman, 98 Georgetown L
J at 613-14 (cited in note 131).
229 California Federal Savings, 479 US at 287.
230 Id (emphasis in original).
231 Id at 285.
232 HR Rep No 95-948 at 4 (cited in note 9). See also S Rep No 95-331 at 41 (remarks
of Senator Williams) (cited in note 59).
233 See note 67.
565] 595
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
B. Similar Ability Comparators Do Not Amount to Preferential
Treatment
The majority rule reasons that comparing pregnant women
to employees injured on the job would grant a pregnant woman
an inappropriate preference-that is, she would be treated like
those injured on the job, even though her disability
originated off the job. 2 34
However, this argument overlooks the true intent of the
PDA's second clause. As analyzed in Part IV.A, Congress
intended for a pregnant women's ability or inability to work to
be compared to an injured worker's ability-not the location of
an injury. 235 Despite Congress' intent, the majority rule holds
that the appropriate comparator is an employee who was injured
off the job. 2 36 As is, this standard is incredibly difficult to satisfy.
The smaller or newer the workplace, the less likely a pregnant
employee is able to establish a comparator who was injured off
the job.
Furthermore, the majority rule incentivizes employers to
provide no accommodations to any workers injured off the job.
Employers hope to avoid workers' compensation costs by not
accommodating pregnant employees. 237 However, the PDA same
treatment clause 2 38 requires treating pregnant women the same
as other similarly situated workers and the majority holds that
the only comparator workers are those with similar ability level
who were injured off the job. Thus in order to comply with the
law, employees who do not wish to accommodate a pregnant
employee will also opt not to accommodate other employees
injured off the job. This is permissible under the idea that an
employer can treat a pregnant employee as poorly as it treats
other similarly situated, non-pregnant employees. 239 Thus, all
234 See note 138 and accompanying text.
235 See HR Rep No 95-948 at 3 (cited in note 9). See also notes 57-61, 222 and
accompanying text.
236 See Troupe, 20 F3d at 738-39 (holding that "employers can treat pregnant
women as badly as they treat similarly affected but nonpregnant employees" and noting
the court's "doubt that finding a comparison group would be that difficult"); Spicey, 196
F3d at 1312-13 (finding that "pregnant employees must be treated the same as every
other employee with a non-occupational injury"). See also note 125.
237 See Brief for Appellant, Sharon Fast Gustafson, Young v United Parcel Service,
Inc, Civil Action No 11-2078, *46 (D Md filed June 11, 2012).
238 See note 67.
239 Troupe, 20 F3d at 738-39 (holding that "employers can treat pregnant women as
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workers stand to be harmed by this standard. Supporters of the
majority position argue that the cost of providing pregnant
employees the same accommodations as employees injured on
the job harms non-pregnant employees. 240 The logic is that
workers compensation and other accommodation costs would
raise the cost of employment such that an employer is likely to
either cut wages or benefits across-the-board for all employees.
Despite its prevalence, this position is untenable for a
number of reasons. First, benefits for on the job injuries predate
the PDA by decades; if Congress wanted to allow differential
treatment, then it likely would have carved out an on the job
injury benefit as an exception to the PDA's equality
requirement.241 This could take the form of an explicit statement
recognizing that on the job injuries are unique and require
distinct treatment. However, Congress included no such carve
out. Additionally, when the PDA was drafted and enacted,
employers claimed it would greatly increase costs. 2 4 2 Congress,
however, analyzed the varying economic estimates and found
that the costs could "be sustained without any undue burden on
employers." 2 4 3 Specifically, the Congressional Budget Office
found that the PDA would result in no additional cost to the
government, 244 and the Department of Labor calculated a total
estimated cost of $191.5 million for employers, which amounted
to a 3.5 percent rise in the cost of temporary disability plans and
a 0.05 percent increase in total payroll costs for workers covered
by those plans. 2 4 5 Furthermore, employers who focus on the cost
of pregnancy accommodation are shortsighted. Pregnancy affects
an employee for a matter of months, a small proportion
compared to the long career that an employee could have in the
badly as they treat similarly affected but nonpregnant employees" and noting the court's
"doubt that finding a comparison group would be that difficult"); Spicey, 196 F3d at
1312-13 (finding that "pregnant employees must be treated the same as every other
employee with a non-occupational injury").
240 See HR Rep No 95-948 at 6 (cited in note 9).
241 See Appellant's Brief, Barbara Harvey, Ensley-Gaines u Runyon, Civil Action No
95-1038, *35-36 (ED Mich filed July 17, 1995). For example, workers compensation is
only applied to injuries that occur in the workplace or in performance of work duties.
Thus, workers compensation is a carved out exception for a benefit that is only given to
job-related injuries.
242 See S Rep No 95-331 at 159 (cited in note 59).
243 Id.
244 See id at 163.
241 See Pregnancy Disability Amendment at 6 (cited in note 62).
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ensuing years. By focusing on the short-term costs, employers
forgo the potential for long-term employment relationships with
otherwise qualified and productive employees. 246
Another concern is that employers will be less willing to
provide accommodations for the off the job injuries if they know
they will also have to extend these same accommodations to
pregnant employees. 247 This argument similarly derives from
fears of increased employment costs. Indeed, primary opposition
to the PDA arose from those concerned about the cost of
including pregnancy in health- and disability-benefit plans. 2 4 8
However, accommodations are an exception, not a norm; only in
certain cases does a pregnant woman need an accommodation. 249
Therefore, the fear that accommodating pregnant women will be
an unbearable expense is unfounded. Furthermore, the same
short-term versus long-term costs rationale discussed above
applies. What an employer may spend during an employee's
pregnancy it saves in other areas, such as a more experienced
workforce and avoided litigation costs. 2 50
An additional counterargument states that giving a
pregnant woman the same accommodation as an employee
injured on the job-and one unavailable to an employee injured
off the job-amounts to reverse discrimination on the basis of
sex.251 The concerns-that this could amount to preferential,
rather than equal, treatment of pregnant employees-are real.
246 "[E]mployers might consider that providing accommodations to pregnant workers
would even be good for the bottom line, in the form of reduced turnover, increased loyalty
and productivity and healthier workers." Dina Bakst, Pregnant, and Pushed Out of a
Job, (NY Times Jan 30, 2014), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/31/
opinion/pregnant-and-pushed-out-of-a-job.html?_r=0 (visited Oct 18, 2014).
247 Opponents of the legislation warned that it could have the unintended effect of
discouraging the creation of disability and medical benefit plans for employees who are
not covered. See HR Rep No 95-948 at 6 (cited in note 9).
248 Id. See also note 250.
249 See Pregnancy Disability Amendment at 6 (cited in note 62) (explaining that the
average time away from work was only seven-and-one-half weeks).
250 See S Rep No 95-331 at 161 (cited in note 59) (noting that "even a very high cost
could not justify continuation of the policy of discrimination against pregnant women
which has played such a major part in the pattern of sex discrimination in this country").
251 The majority rule accepted the employer's argument that calls the request for a
comparator with an employee injured on the job a demand for preferential treatment
that would harm other, non-pregnant employees. See Brief of Appellee, Robin E. Curtis
and Margaret Coullard Phillips, Urbano v Continental Airlines, Inc, Civil Action No 96-
21115, *6 (SD Tex filed May 13, 1997); Urbano, 138 F3d at 208 (holding that "Urbano's
claim is thus not a request for relief from discrimination, but rather a demand for
preferential treatment").
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However, these concerns are insufficient to overcome the
countervailing benefits. Pregnancy is not an injury in the sense
of a harm that occurs either on the job or off the job. It is a
natural event for many women, but courts still have recognized
that "pregnancy is unique" and "[t]hat pregnancy itself is not an
'abnormal medical condition."' 2 52 The Supreme Court even
stated that, "[n]ormal pregnancy is an objectively identifiable
physical condition with unique characteristics." 2 53 Therefore, a
legal distinction between pregnancy and injury should exist.
Pregnancy is a natural and necessary part of life while injuries
are typically unwanted and often occur due to carelessness.
Interpreting the PDA to accommodate pregnancy as an
employer would accommodate an on the job injury, as Congress
intended, both recognizes these distinctions and benefits both
sexes since it allows mothers to maintain their jobs and continue
supporting their families during pregnancy and after delivery. 254
In explaining the majority rule's off the job injury
requirement, the Seventh Circuit expressed doubt "that finding
a comparison group would be that difficult." 2 55 This implies that
establishing a similarly situated employee would be easy. 2 56
However, in the nineteen years since that decision, only three
appellate level cases found that a pregnant employee
established an appropriate comparator. 257 These decisions came
from the Sixth and Eighth Circuits-both circuits applying the
minority rule-and only in two cases did the appellate courts
find in favor of a pregnant employee who sought to prove her
differential treatment by demonstrating another group was
212 Monmouth County Correctional Institutional Inmates u Lanzaro, 834 F2d 326,
348 (3d Cir 1987).
213 Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co u EEOC, 462 US 669, 676 n 12
(1983).
254 See notes 1-2, 74 and accompanying text.
255 Troupe, 20 F3d at 739.
216 See id.
217 See Latowski, 2013 US App LEXIS 25738 at *14-17 (holding that it did not
matter if one employee's medical condition was work-related and the pregnant
employee's was not; the essential similarity must be the ability of the employee to
perform her work); Walker, 156 Fed Appx at 885 (holding that although the employee
identified a suitable, similarly situated comparator, the court found the employer's
reason for the policy change to be legitimate); Adams, 962 F2d at 795-96 (holding that
the plaintiff demonstrated that some officers with off the job injuries or conditions other
than pregnancy in fact were given light duty assignments to accommodate their
condition).
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treated more favorably. 258 Thus, even in cases where a pregnant
employee is able to establish a similarly situated comparator
group or individual, pregnant women have largely been unable
to succeed. 259 If a pregnant woman cannot prevail in a situation
with a similarly situated comparator and no written evidence
supporting the employer's offered reason for denial of
accommodation, then when can a pregnant woman prevail under
the current majority test? If the Seventh Circuit's argument that
identifying a comparator were as easy as asserted, then
pregnant women should have more success establishing a
comparator of similarly situated employees and winning in those
cases. Pregnant women, however, rarely establish a comparator
and almost never win Title VII claims; a pregnant woman has
never succeeded in a circuit following the majority rule. While
the evidentiary standard is not insurmountable, the majority
rule includes an unnecessary hurdle for pregnant employees.
One possible reason for the lack of successful cases is that
employers are no longer discriminating against pregnant
women. Thus, the argument suggests that while it used to be
common practice to treat pregnant women worse than
employees injured off the job, such as in a car accident or home
repair accident, it simply is not the case anymore. However,
during the same time period that discrimination allegedly
diminished, the number of PDA cases has continued to increase
and the EEOC issued new guidance for handling pregnancy
discrimination. 260 Thus, pregnancy discrimination cases are still
frequently filed and the majority rule interpretation seems to be
preventing pregnant employees from accessing the tools
provided by the PDA.
Employers have argued that adopting the minority rule
"construction of the PDA would be to except the claims of
pregnant workers from Title VII's requirement of proof of
discrimination and from the traditional McDonnell Douglas ...
258 The court in Walker found the employer's economic reasons for the employment
decision valid. See Walker, 156 Fed Appx at 885. The courts held for the plaintiff in the
other two instances. See Latowski, 2013 US App LEXIS 25738 at *14-17; Adams, 962
F2d at 795-96.
259 The Eighth Circuit affirmed a finding for the employer, despite the pregnant
employee's demonstration of a similarly situated class that received distinct treatment
accommodations. See Walker, 156 Fed Appx at 882.
260 See notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
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analytical framework." 261 However, this argument does not
reflect the actual application of the minority rule framework;
under the minority construction the McDonnell Douglas
framework is applied in exactly the same manner except for the
nature of the comparator that will satisfy prong four. 2 62
C. Applying the Proposed Solution: Only Require Comparators
with Similar Ability Level
Many commentators advocate for accommodation legislation
modeled on the Americans with Disabilities Act. 2 63 At this stage,
however, it is more important to recognize how difficult passing
new legislation currently is and consider other options. A more
tenable solution involves the simple but powerful act of
interpreting the PDA's same treatment clause as it was
intended-comparing ability to another employee with a similar
ability level no matter where the injury originated. 264 This
means that the comparator for a pregnant employee would be
another employee who is similarly situated in his ability or
inability to work without regard to the cause of the inability to
work. As analyzed throughout, but particularly in Part I.C and
Part IV, this interpretation matches the congressional intent
and allows pregnant women equal employment opportunities.
Thus, the solution is simply to follow the PDA as it was
intended.
Current conditions provide further rationale for solving the
circuit split in a simple but effective manner. 265 As discussed,
261 Brief for the Postmaster General, Saul A. Green and Elizabeth J. Larin, Ensley-
Gaines u Runyon, Civil Action No 95-1038, *27 (ED Mich filed Sept 26, 1995).
262 See text accompanying note 99.
263 The specific accommodations could include short-term modifications of tasks,
assignments to alternate positions, more frequent breaks, or enabling the employee to sit
when justified by a particular woman's medical condition. See Grossman, 98 Georgetown
L J at 625 (cited in note 131). See also Widiss, 46 UC Davis L Rev at 969, 1035 (cited in
note 11) (arguing that ADA-accommodated employees are the appropriate comparators
for PDA analysis); Maryn Oyoung, Until Men Bear Children, Women Must Not Bear the
Costs of Reproductive Capacity: Accommodating Pregnancy in the Workplace to Achieve
Equal Employment Opportunities, 44 McGeorge L Rev 515, 539-42 (2013) (advocating
for a new federal law accommodating pregnancy that requires "reasonable
accommodation for women's unique reproductive capacities").
264 'H.R. 6075 unmistakably reaffirms that sex discrimination includes
discrimination based on pregnancy, and specifically defines standards which require that
pregnant workers be treated the same as other employees on the basis of their ability or
inability to work." HR Rep No 95-948 at 3 (cited in note 9).
26' The number of claims of pregnancy discrimination to the Equal Employment
565] 601
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
the number of pregnancy discrimination cases is on the rise. 2 66
The EEOC has responded by issuing new pregnancy
discrimination guidance and by including pregnancy-related
accommodation limitations in its latest Strategic Enforcement
Plan.2 67 These EEOC efforts demonstrate the importance of
using the PDA to eliminate pregnancy discrimination, as the Act
intended. However, the current split prevents consistent and
effective litigation of pregnancy discrimination. Appellate courts
can move to adopt the minority rule by focusing on the text of
the same treatment clause. 2 68 The courts following the majority
rule may distinguish their existing precedent by revisiting the
legislative history, acknowledging that the PDA establishes a
floor (as opposed to a ceiling), and identifying a similar ability
comparator when presented such evidence. In light of the
growing number of women choosing to work during pregnancy,
the increasing number of pregnancy discrimination filings, and
the different outcomes depending on jurisdiction, it is time for
the Supreme Court to again examine the PDA's accommodation
clause. 269
V. CONCLUSION
Increasingly more women are choosing to work during their
pregnancies-with nearly two-thirds of pregnant women
working, 270 and the number of pregnancy discrimination cases
Opportunity Commission from pregnant women increased nearly 23 percent from 2005
to 2011. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Pregnancy Discrimination
Charges (cited in note 3).
266 See note 3 and accompanying text.
267 In July 2014, the EEOC published new "Enforcement Guidelines on Pregnancy
Discrimination and Related Issues." The 2012 EEOC Strategic Enforcement Plan (SEP)
names pregnancy discrimination as a focus of enforcement efforts over the next few
years. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC Issues Updated
Enforcement Guidance; Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission Strategic Enforcement Plan FY 2013 2016 § III.B;
see also notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
268 See note 67.
269 The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's writ of certiorari on July 1, 2014. Oral
arguments are set for December 3, 2014. See Young v United Parcel Service, 134 S Ct
374 (2013). In Young, the Fourth Circuit held that an employee injured off the job with a
similar ability is the only acceptable comparator for a pregnant employee. Young, 707
F3d at 450-51. See notes 156-163 and accompanying text.
270 'Between 1961 and 1965, for example, 44 percent of first-time mothers worked
during their pregnancies; in contrast, between 2006 and 2008, nearly two-thirds of first-
time mothers worked while pregnant. Women are also working later into their
pregnancies. Between 1961 and 1965, less than 35 percent of working first-time mothers
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expanded nearly 23 percent between 2005 and 2011.271 With the
growing role of women in the labor market, 2 7 2 enabling capable
women to continue working is a top concern. However, a circuit
split over the interpretation of the same treatment clause of the
PDA makes it increasingly difficult for pregnant women who are
discriminated against to recover under Title VII. The issue
revolves around which type of employee establishes a suitable
comparator for the pregnant employee. The majority rule holds
that the suitable comparator is a similarly situated employee
who was injured off the job. 2 73 In contrast, the minority rule
disregards the location of the injury and requires that a
comparator be similar in his or her ability or inability to work. 2 7 4
The majority interpretation-while arguably facially neutral-
enables the ongoing discrimination of pregnant women. Instead,
the minority rule focuses on the ability level, as the same
treatment clause requires. 275 This plain meaning interpretation
of the PDA more closely aligns with the legislative intent 276 and
enables discriminated against pregnant women to recover until
Title VII. Thus, by realigning the comparator to focus on ability
level, the circuit split can be resolved and the PDA fulfill
Congress' intentions. To continue on the path towards equal
employment opportunities for all-irrespective of race, color,
religion, sex and national origin-pregnant women must also
were still on the job one month or less before giving birth. But times have changed. Now
an overwhelming majority of first-time mothers are working late into their pregnancies.
Almost nine out of ten (88 percent) first-time mothers who worked while pregnant
worked into their last two months of pregnancy in 2006-2008, and more than eight out
of ten (82 percent) worked into their last month of pregnancy." See Martin, et al, It
Shouldn't Be a Heavy Lifts at *3 (cited in note 1); United States Census Bureau,
Maternity Leave and Employment Patterns of First-time Mothers: 1961-2008 4 (2011),
online at http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p70- 128.pdf (visited Oct 18, 2014).
271 The number of claims of pregnancy discrimination to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission from pregnant women increased nearly 23 percent from 2005
to 2011. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Pregnancy Discrimination
Charges (cited in note 3).
272 Annie Lowrey, How Working Women Help the Economy, (NY Times Apr 15,
2014), online at http://mobile.nytimes.com/blogs/economix/2014/04/15/how-working-
women-help-the-economy/?emc edit tnt_2014042 1&nlid=67422460&tnte
mail0=y (visited Oct 18, 2014).
273 See note 13; see also Part III.A.
274 See note 15; see also Part III.B.
275 See note 67; see also Part IV.B and C.
276 "H.R. 6075 unmistakably reaffirms that sex discrimination includes
discrimination based on pregnancy, and specifically defines standards which require that
pregnant workers be treated the same as other employees on the basis of their ability or
inability to work." HR Rep No 95-948 at 3 (cited in note 9).
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receive equal accommodations as employees of similar ability
levels.
